PSIR Optional Paper II Section A by R P. Singh

Model Answer

Question #1. Realist tradition of International relations revolves around debated concept of power. Examine.

Hints:

Power is the core concept for realist tradition of international thought. But instead of having a single common notion of power, there is no consensus on how to define the term power. Some realists understand power to be the sum of the military, economic, technological and diplomatic and other capabilities at the disposal of the state. Others see power not as some absolute value determined for each state as if it were in vacuum but rather, as capabilities relative to the capabilities of the other states.

Both of these definitions assume a static view of power. An alternative, dynamic definition of power focuses on the interaction of the states. A State's influence (or capability to influence or coerce) is not only determined by its capabilities (or relative capabilities) but also by 

• Its willingness (and perceptions by other states of its willingness) to use these capabilities 
• Its control or influence over other states.

Power can thus be inferred by observing the behaviour of the states as they interact. The relative power of sates is most clearly revealed by the outcomes of their interactions.

Examples of diverse views of power are the following definitions drawn from the realist literature: 

• Power as the capacity of an individual , group , or nation " to influence the behaviour of others in accordance with one's one ends "
• Power as " man's control over the minds and actions of other men" , Power as "the ability to prevail in conflict and overcome obstacles".

Question #2. Comment on how ‘Security Dilemma’ actually results in an atmosphere of 'insecurity' in the long run.

Hints:

• This concept rests on the assumption that security is something for which states compete. In an anarchical international system lacking any authority capable of ensuring order, states have to look to their own efforts for protection. Striving to obtain this, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of other states.
• This, in turn, makes the others more insecure and encourages them to prepare for the worst. Since no state can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing states, competition follows, and the result is a rising spiral of insecurity among states. 
• The security dilemma describes a condition in which efforts to improve national security have the effect of appearing to threaten other states, thereby provoking military counter-moves. This in turn can lead to ante decrease in security for all states. The security dilemma encapsulates one of the many difficult choices facing some governments. 
• On the one hand, they can relax defence efforts in order to facilitate peaceful relations; the problem here is that they may make their country more vulnerable to attack. On the other hand, they can strengthen defence preparations, but this can have the unintended consequence of undermining long-term security by exacerbating international suspicions and reinforcing pressures for arms racing. The result can be military conflict, and many commentators have argued that a paradigmatic example of the security dilemma led to the First World War (1914-18).
• It is important to note that the security dilemma arises primarily from the alleged structure of the international system rather than the aggressive motives or intentions of states. This structural basis is exacerbated by the understandably conservative inclinations of defence planners to prepare for the worst and focus on the capabilities of their rivals rather than rely on their benign intentions. 
• Ignorance and competition among different branches of the armed forces for government funds can fuel worst-case analysis. Thus while the structure of the international system must be seen as a fundamental precondition for the security dilemma, its intensity is a consequence both of the inherently violent nature of military capabilities and the degree to which states perceive others as threats rather than allies. Since these two factors are variable over space and time, the intensity of the security dilemma is very unevenly distributed among states.
• It is worth noting how each of them can vary. First, the intensity of the security dilemma varies depending both on the degree to which one can distinguish between defensive and offensive weapons, as well as the relationship between them. Other things being equal, and acknowledging that weapons can be used offensively and defensively, some types of weapons are more suited to defence than offence. Defensive force configurations emphasise firepower with limited mobility and range (e.g. anti-tank missiles), and offensive configurations emphasise mobility and range (e.g. fighter-bombers).
• Advocates of what is called non-offensive defence believe that the security dilemma can be muted by the adoption of force configurations that are least likely to provoke counter-measures by other states. In part this depends on the degree to which defensive military technology is superior to offensive capabilities. If potential enemies each believe that the best form of defence (and deterrence) is preparing to attack, it is not difficult to see how they could be locked into a vicious circle of mutually reinforcing suspicions. 
• Second, the intensity of the security dilemma varies depending on the political relationship between states. Capabilities should not be examined in a political vacuum. The degree of trust and sense of common interest in the international system is neither fixed nor uniform. There is no security dilemma between Australia and New Zealand because neither state considers the other a threat to its national security.
• At the end of the twentieth century there remains no consensus about the severity of the security dilemma, particularly between states that possess nuclear weapons. On the one hand, the phenomenon of mutually assured destruction on the basis of a secure second-strike capability would seem to ensure the supremacy of defence over offence.
• On the other hand, there remains doubt over the credibility of defensive capability that offers little choice between suicide and surrender. Some scholars argue that the security dilemma is particularly amongst the great powers, simply because the strategic and economic gains from expanding one's territorial control are very few. In an age of economic interdependence, and in light of the degree of economic integration that exists today, it could be argued that what is called a security community exists, at least in North America, Western Europe, Australasia, and among some states in East Asia.
• A security community is one whose members are confident that the likelihood of force being used to resolve conflicts between them is extremely low. Another parts of the world, however, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, the dynamics of the security dilemma remain potent danger.