A China-led trilateral nexus as India’s new challenge

Last week, China, Pakistan and Bangladesh held their first trilateral meeting in Kunming, China. The discussions focused on furthering cooperation and the possibilities of deeper engagement. This meeting closely follows another trilateral meeting between China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, held in May, to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

The China-Pakistan Nexus: A Strategic Alliance Against India

• Origins of the Alliance: The 1962 India-China war catalysed an enduring strategic partnership between China and Pakistan, aimed at countering India’s regional influence. Post-war, China identified Pakistan as a key ally to engage India with immediate security threats, thereby limiting New Delhi’s ability to challenge Beijing’s interests, security, and global status.
• Economic and Military Dependence: Pakistan’s reliance on China has deepened over the decades, with significant economic and military support shaping its strategic posture. By the end of 2024, Pakistan’s debt to China exceeded $29 billion, primarily for infrastructure and investments. It is estimated that over 80% of Pakistan’s arms imports are from China.
• Diplomatic Shielding: China has consistently protected Pakistan on international platforms, notably shielding Pakistan-backed terrorists at the United Nations Security Council. This camaraderie was largely visible during India’s Operation Sindoor in May 2025, following the Pakistan-sponsored Pahalgam terror attack.

Resurfacing Strategic Manoeuvres: The Trilateral Threat

• Historical Precedents: The concept of leveraging regional countries against India is not new. In 1965, Pakistan explored using East Pakistan, China, and Nepal to threaten India’s strategic Siliguri Corridor. This idea of using South Asian countries seems to have resurfaced as both China and Pakistan face a confident India.
• India’s Assertive Response: India’s decisive responses to Pakistan-sponsored terror attacks in Uri (2016), Pulwama (2019), and Pahalgam (2025) have signalled a shift from tolerance of Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail. Measures like suspending the Indus Waters Treaty, halting trade, restricting port access, and targeting military installations have weakened Pakistan’s military confidence.
• Regional Realignments: India’s pragmatic engagement and domestic politics of the region have slowed down China’s momentum in South Asia. In the Maldives, President Muizzu’s initial anti-India stance has shifted toward reliance on New Delhi for economic stability. Nepal’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects with China face funding disputes, while Sri Lanka’s President Dissanayake has prioritised ties with India.

China’s Regional Ambitions and India’s Countermeasures:

• China’s Trilateral Strategy: China’s push for trilaterals with Afghanistan and Bangladesh reflects its anxieties over India’s growing influence. Post-2021 and 2024 regime changes, both Afghanistan and Bangladesh have tilted toward Pakistan and China, raising concerns about new terror and security challenges.
• Balancing Regional Dynamics: South Asian nations face the challenge of balancing relations with India and China, as Beijing leverages Pakistan to complicate regional dynamics.
• India’s Strategic Imperatives: The developments in the region demonstrate, once again, that China, and not Pakistan, is India’s biggest challenge. On its part, Delhi will have to continue to express redlines and convey the point that any misadventures by its neighbours could have severe economic, military, and political costs.

Practice Question:

Q. Discuss the strategic implications of China’s trilateral engagements with Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh in countering India’s influence in South Asia. What measures can India adopt to mitigate the emerging security and diplomatic challenges?