India–China Border Dialogue

The 24th round of Special Representatives (SR) talks between India and China was held in August 2025 to advance discussions on a “reasonable and mutually acceptable framework” for boundary settlement based on the 2005 Political Parameters agreement.

Evolution of India–China Border Negotiations

Vajpayee’s Initiatives and Early Efforts

• 1979 Visit to China: Atal Bihari Vajpayee, as External Affairs Minister, initiated the process of normalisation post-1962 war.
• 2003 Visit as Prime Minister: Proposed political-level engagement; Special Representatives mechanism established.
• Political Parameters Agreement (2005): Both sides agreed on broad principles — safeguarding settled populations, strategic considerations, and natural geographical features.

Political Parameters Agreement, 2005

• Core Principles: Settlement from a political perspective, not purely legal-historical.
• Article IV: Recognition of each other’s strategic and reasonable interests.
• Article VII: Protection of settled populations in border areas.
• Strategic Understanding: Suggested a potential “as-is-where-is” settlement (Aksai Chin with China, Arunachal Pradesh with India).

Challenges and Stalled Progress

• China’s Reversal (2007): Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi dismissed the “settled populations” safeguard, reviving claims over Tawang.
• Ambiguity in Framework: Despite claims of an “18-point consensus” by 2013, lack of political will hindered finalisation.
• Border Incidents:Chumar (2014), Doklam (2017), Galwan crisis (2020) undermined trust and highlighted failure of earlier border management agreements (1993, 1996, 2005, 2013).

Recent Developments

• Resumption of Talks (2025): After years of stagnation, both SRs agreed to revive discussions on the 2005 framework.
• Early Harvest Agreement: Proposed settlement of the Sikkim–Tibet boundary as a first step.
• Border Management Reforms: Tasked with replacing outdated mechanisms post-2020 clashes.

Strategic Implications

• Persistent Military Buildup: Both countries face heavy costs in sustaining deployments across the LAC.
• Regional Impact: Involves third-country trijunctions (Bhutan, Nepal, Myanmar, Pakistan).
• Geopolitical Stakes: Border resolution could reshape bilateral relations, reduce friction in BRICS, SCO, and enhance regional stability.

Way Forward

• Political Commitment: Without top-level political will, technical negotiations will remain inconclusive.
• Confidence-Building Measures: Joint patrolling, disengagement zones, and mechanisms for real-time communication to prevent clashes.
• Incremental Agreements: Early settlement of less contentious sectors (Sikkim, middle sector) before tackling complex areas (Western and Eastern sectors).
• Regional Cooperation: Consultation with third-country stakeholders (Bhutan, Nepal) to prevent future disputes.
• Strategic Realism:Recognising that indefinite militarisation along the LAC is unsustainable for both economies.