PSIR Optional (Indian Politics) by Viraj C Rane

Model Answer

Question #1. Impact of land reforms in India.  10 marks (150 words)

Approach:

• Introduction: Land reforms for social justice; importance land redistribution and the methods.
• Body: Evaluation of its impact: positives and negatives.
• Conclusion: Despite the limitations, its contribution; Myrdal’s views; computerization of land records.

Land reforms are visualised as an instrument of social justice as they seek to do away with exploitative relationships characterised by sharp class division between rich landowning classes and impoverished peasants with no security of tenure. It is a step against the concentration of land holdings in the hands of a few absentee/non-cultivating owners, through imposition of ceilings on the size of holdings, which can be owned by a family.

Impact:

1. Abolition of intermediaries/zamindaris:

• The Planning Commission estimates that at least twenty million tenants were brought into direct relationship with the governments.
• Another achievement was that the ownership of common property resources like forests, lakes, ponds was vested in the government.
• The most adverse effect, however, was the ejecting of a large number of tenants by claiming their land for personal cultivation

2. Impact on tenancy reforms:

• According to PS Appu, in his book Land reforms writes that Kerala and West Bengal are two states where tenancy reforms have been relatively successful. Political will, mass organizations of insecure tenants are the important reasons for the success.
• The tenants got ownership on about 4 percent of the operated land although 150 lakh acres were identified for the purpose.
• Tenancy reforms can only be implemented if there is proper recording of the tenancies and support from the administration.

3. Impact on land ceiling and redistribution:

• The land which has been declared surplus and distributed constitute less than 2 percent of the total cultivated land. Hence, it cannot be said that there was a major impact on the land distribution in the country due to this step.
• Absence of land records, benami records, corrupt patwaris, indifferent bureaucratic leadership and lack of political will, contributed to the failure of the programme.

Conclusion:

Gunnar Myrdal says that, "Despite the weakness of the land reforms to abolish should not be taken lightly dismissed as it brought about changes in the rural power structure and was a great effort towards reconstruction of Indian agriculture.” But at the same time, the impact was not so significant as was expected, nor was it as much as it was in other countries, like China and Soviet Russia. However, it did result in increased democratization of Indian polity and reduction in influence of the dominant sections of the society. The government of India is now focusing on the computerization of land records which is a crucial component of land reforms.

Question #2. Is the Election Commission of India a toothed tiger which refuses to bite? What are the reforms required for the Election Commission of India to function as a truly autonomous body? 15 marks (250 words)

Approach:

• Introduction: The role of election commission of India and its contributions
• Body: Evaluations of its powers, limitation and focus on Article 324 as an empowering provision
• Conclusion: Despite the limitations, the ECI can invoke Article 324 to address all issues relating to electoral practice.

Free, fair and transparent elections are bedrock of democratic process. Rudolph and Rudolph note that the Election Commission has a key position at the heart of the new regulatory centrism of the Indian state, as an institution which acts as an enforcer of 'rules that safeguard the democratic legitimacy of the political system'. The Constituent Assembly envisaged an independent Election Commission which would organize and implement the wider electoral framework upon which the democratic state was built. ECI has been credited with successful conduct of elections from 1952. From time to time it came up with innovations like Model code of conduct, EVMs, suspension of campaigning 48 hrs prior to polling for silent contemplation by the voters, VVPATS, NOTA to improve the election process. 

Powers of the ECI:

• The cornerstone of EC mandate derives from Article 324 of the Indian constitution which grants it authority over the ‘superintendence, direction and control’ of the preparation of electoral rolls, delimitation, administration of election and surveillance of probity of electoral conduct.
• The broad nature of the constitutional framework not only gave it solid underpinning but also allowed for greater flexibility in enforcing the mandate.
• The responsibilities of the Election Commission are not only limited to conducting free and fair elections but also involves rendering a quasi-judicial function between the various political parties.
• Election Commission ensures a level playing field for the political parties in election fray, through observance by them of a Model Code of Conduct evolved with the consensus of political parties.
• The EC has the power to suspend or withdraw recognition of a political party for its failure to abide by the model code of conduct or the directions of the EC.

Criticism/Limitations of the functioning of ECI:

• Though, MCC violations occur at great regularity, the EC has rarely taken recourse to this power, instead it has issued warnings and reprimands.
• The ECI is accused of going soft on the ruling party.
• According to Representation of People Act, 1951, Section 29 A, the EC is the registering authority for all political parties, but the power to register does not carry with it the ancillary power of de-registering a political party. Former CEC Navin Chawla opines that this severely limits the role ECI can play in regulating the bogus parties.
• Lack of legal backing for MCC.
• Limited role in controlling money and muscle power in elections.
• Limited role in regulating hate speech. In this regard the Supreme court said that the ECI can only bark but not bite.

Reasons for the ECI’s reluctance to act:

• Anupama Roy, Prof of Political Science, points out the paradoxical position: On the one hand, it is formally a state institution reliant on the state for funding and functionaries, while on the other, its professional mandate requires it to oversee the very state that it depends on.
• The appointment of the Chief election commissioner and the election commissioners has been cited as reason for lack of independence and politicization of the ECI.
• Lack of legislative backing to address issue like money influence and hate speech.

Article 324 and its interpretation as the empowering principle 

While the Constitution doesn’t clearly give it the powers nor are there legislations to back every the ECI in every sphere, it is pertinent to note the inference made by the Supreme court that Article 324 operates in an “area left unoccupied by legislation”. The Court concluded that the framers of the Constitution left it to the wisdom of the Election Commission of the time, to deal with the innumerable issues or problems that may arise. Hence the ECI can invoke powers under Article 324 like it did in cancelling the poll in RK Nagar constituency in Tamil Nadu due to suspect electoral malpractice of money distribution. In recent assembly elections in West Bengal, it curtailed the campaigning period to prevent communal issues.

Conclusion:

Christophe Jaffrelot in the book The Great March of Democracy argues, that the effectiveness of institutions depends on the personalities that run them. He says that as aspersions continue to be cast on the ECI now, the poll body doesn’t need a new mandate. What it requires is a new resolve to save its own face. He cites the example of former CEC TN Seshan under whose leadership the ECI functioned not only a toothed tiger but also like one which had claws. This clearly goes on to say that it is inconsistency in action but not the lack of enabling provisions which limit the role of ECI. This view is endorsed by Trilochan Sastri, chairman of ADR, who succinctly puts it: ECI can exercise far more powers when it chooses to. 

Supplementary information:

Dinesh Goswami Committee in 1990 and the Law Commission in 2015 recommended establishing a multi-institutional, bipartisan committee for fair and transparent selection of ECs can enhance the perceived and actual independence of ECI. The international experience can be emulated. In South Africa Election Commissioners are appointed by the President on the recommendations of the National Assembly, following nominations by a National Assembly inter-party committee. In the US, the six Federal Election Commissioners are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

According to S.Y. Quraishi to say that the EC is toothless in ensuring that the MCC is followed is wrong. It probably needs a little more will power to act strongly, particularly against the ruling party, because the ruling party always has an advantage which has to be neutralised. 

TN Seshan, the former CEC simply acted with a lot of zeal to enforce the model code of conduct, the same one that the current ECI claimed has very “limited powers. “Seshan effect” famously instilled the rule of law necessary for free and fair polls. TN Seshan, ensured that ECI became a powerful poll regulator rather than a mere organiser. 

Steps towards ushering procedural certainty include maintaining stability in rules and procedures, helps in autonomous functioning of EC. Further, Amendment of law to make `paid news’ an electoral offence and amendments in appointment process and financing of EC are necessary to make EC truly autonomous. It is argued that the existing position cannot sustain itself for long as the governments from time to time will try to influence the constitutional office of the Election Commission. It is time to bring about substantial changes for enabling the constitutional body.