Pakistan’s Terror Infrastructure

For decades, Pakistan has been a focal point in discussions about terrorism, primarily because of the close connections between its security forces, particularly the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and various militant groups. These groups have become key tools in Pakistan's foreign policy, particularly in its approach toward India, Afghanistan, and the broader region.

Roots of the Terror Infrastructure: The Soviet-Afghan War

• The origins of Pakistan's militant networks trace back to the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989).
• During this period, Pakistan used jihadist groups as a counterforce against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
• The ISI played a central role in recruiting and training fighters, many of whom became part of a larger, more complex web of terror organizations.
• Initially, these groups were focused on fighting against the Soviet forces, but after the war ended, they evolved to pursue Pakistan’s broader strategic objectives, especially targeting India and influencing Afghanistan.
• Key Terror Groups with Links to Pakistan
  • Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT): Founded in the early 1990s, LeT has been one of Pakistan's most prominent proxy organizations. Its primary objective is to carry out attacks against India, particularly focusing on Kashmir.
    • Training and Operations: LeT operates training camps not just in Pakistan, but also in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Their infamous attacks, such as the 2008 Mumbai attacks, have left a lasting mark. LeT has also been implicated in various other incidents, such as the 2006 Mumbai train bombings and attacks on Indian military establishments.
  • Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM): Founded in 2000 by Masood Azhar, JeM has been responsible for numerous high-profile attacks against India, including the 2001 Indian Parliament attack and the 2019 Pulwama suicide bombing.
    • Unlike LeT, JeM specializes in suicide bombings, particularly using fidayeen (suicide) attacks.
  • Support Structures and State Links: Pakistan's terror infrastructure isn’t just about these two groups. Several smaller but significant outfits also play a role in its broader strategy. For example:

• The Haqqani Network, which operates primarily in Afghanistan, serves as both an ISI proxy and a facilitator for anti-India operations. Even though it operates in Afghanistan, it has longstanding ties with Pakistan's military establishment.
• ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K), an offshoot of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), operates in Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal areas. While ideologically opposed to Pakistan, there are indications that some elements within the Pakistani security establishment tacitly allow their operations, particularly in areas of mutual interest.

Financing and Radicalization

A key aspect of Pakistan's terror network is its financing and radicalization mechanisms.

• Charitable Fronts: Many terror groups rely on religious charities as a primary source of funds. These groups are often registered as humanitarian organizations but funnel money into militant activities.
• State Sponsorship: Despite officially claiming to be part of the global "War on Terror" post-9/11, Pakistan’s security apparatus continues to support certain terror groups, often in the form of direct funding. Estimates suggest that Pakistan allocates between $100-125 million annually to these groups.
• Money Laundering and Smuggling: Networks like hawala (illegal money transfer systems) and narcotics trafficking play an important role in funding terrorist activities. The Afghanistan-Pakistan-India corridor is a major route for the drug trade, generating substantial revenue for these organizations.
• Radicalization Infrastructure: Madrassas (religious schools) are a central feature of Pakistan's radicalization process. There are over 30,000 madrassas in Pakistan, with around 10-15% directly linked to extremist organizations.

• Pakistan’s continued support for terrorism poses significant challenges to regional stability, particularly in South Asia.
• India remains the primary target of these terror organizations, suffering both direct attacks (like the Mumbai attacks and Pulwama bombing) and indirect effects (such as the long-term instability in Kashmir).
• The international community has long recognized the need to address Pakistan’s role in sustaining these terror networks.
  • Pakistan’s repeated appearance on the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) grey list highlights the systemic failure to curb terror financing. The FATF has demanded that Pakistan take concrete actions to dismantle these networks, yet little progress has been made.